good 4 (e)u(thyphro)

Answering the age-old dilemma

Mar 27, 2025

What makes something good?

Is goodness simply a description we use to indicate that something is not harmful?

A Utilitarian might say that a thing is good if it produces some benefit. Helping an elderly woman cross the street keeps her safe (and makes you both happier in the process): good!

This question has plagued philosophers and theologians across centuries. All cultures, all peoples, in all times, have striven to do, be, and understand good.

But, what is it? When can we say that something has met that standard? How, why, when should we set aside our own desires and ideals for its sake? C.S. Lewis would say, “always.” Ayn Rand would say, “never.”

This week, I want to take a look at one of the oldest formulations of this question: The Euthyphro Dilemma.

Meet Euthyphro

Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro recounts a conversation between the ancient philosopher Socrates and the Athenian prophet Euthyphro that takes place in the days before Socrates’ final trial.

During the conversation, Socrates and Euthyphro attempt to get to the bottom of a seemingly simple question: What is piety, and what is impiety?

Euthyphro comes out of the gate with a simple, but effective definition:

“Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.”1

Socrates quickly pokes holes in this clean explanation. What about when the gods disagree? The ancient Greek Pantheon was full of drama, and an action deemed pious by one could easily be dismissed as impious by another.

The conversation, driven by Socrates’ incessant questioning, gets to be too confusing for Euthyphro.

“I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from us.”

The two thinkers never quite land on a solution—a situation characteristic of ancient philosophy—but throughout the course of their conversation, Socrates articulates what has now become known as the Euthyphro Dilemma:

“The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.”

In our modern, monotheistic world, we tend to put it this way: “Is something good because God commands it, or does God command certain things because they are good?”

What’s the problem?

Maybe this doesn’t sound like too much of an issue to you, but consider the consequences of each horn (or half) of the dilemma:

If things are good simply because God commands them, then that means that there really are no objective moral standards and duties. Greg Koukl explains: “The content of morality would be arbitrary, dependent on God’s whim. Though God has declared murder, theft, and debauchery wrong, it could have been otherwise had God willed it so.”2

Thus, “good” is reduced to God’s whims, which are simply enforced by his power. This is not the God of Christianity.

The second horn doesn’t provide any more comfort, though. To affirm that God commands things because they are good implies that there is some standard of “good” that God is beholden to; in other words, something outside of God that he must submit to or follow.

This isn’t a new development, but old-school Platonism, which held that everything we encounter in the real world has a more real, ultimate “Form.” Horn #2 implies that there really is an object out there called Good that we’re trying to find.

Answering the dilemma

So, neither option works. We believe in truly objective (unchanging) moral standards and duties; yet, we also believe that God is the Almighty, the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last—he’s certainly not beholden to anything outside of himself.

Can Christianity answer Euthyphro?

Of course!

Perhaps you’ve already sniffed out the problem with this dilemma. If not, I’ll give you a hint: it’s not actually a dilemma at all, but a false dilemma.

By presenting two seemingly exclusive options, the philosopher attempts to back the Christian into a corner, forcing her to say that God is either despotic and capricious, or otherwise lacking in power.

But there’s a third way.

Objective morality does exist, but it’s not found outside of God.

“Rather, God wills something because he is good. That is to say, it is God’s own nature which determines what is the good. God is, by nature, essentially compassionate, just, fair, kind, loving, and so forth. And because he is good, his commandments to us reflect, necessarily, his nature. And therefore, the commandments of God and our moral duties are rooted in God’s essence. They are not arbitrary, they’re rooted in God himself, but they aren’t grounded in anything external to God. God is himself the good who is the source of our moral duties.”3 (William Lane Craig)

This, in part, is why we’re able to make determinations about what is morally right or wrong even when there exists no explicit command. I know it would be immoral to use ChatGPT to write these articles but pass them off as my own original work. Those words aren’t explicitly stated anywhere in scripture, yet I know that God is a God of truth; for me to deliberately lie or deceive in such a way would be to transgress against the objective standard found in him.

The distinction is nuanced, but it’s important. The Euthyphro dilemma hasn’t lost any popularity in the 2000 or so years since it first popped up; if you haven’t come across it yet, you certainly will before long. As always, it’s best to be ready when the time comes, “always being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you.” 1 Peter 3:15

Lots of people have spent lots of time trying to break Christianity apart; yet, our hope is in a living God, who sustains his people and cannot be reduced by simple arguments. Don’t run from the dilemmas, but face them with confidence. Take the time to understand what they’re claiming, dig into the responses, and work at it until it makes sense.